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The impact of catastrophes on shareholder value
A Research Report Sponsored by Sedgwick Group
Templeton College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 5NY, England
Tel +44 (0)1865 422500 Fax +44 (0)1865 422501 www.templeton.ox.ac.uk
On 11 May, at around two pm Eastern time, ValuJet
by management may be redundant from the view of
DC-9 Flight 592 bound for Atlanta crashed into the
Florida Everglades soon after take-off from Miami.
All passengers and crew perished. This was a human
It is too early to say what the full effect of the
catastrophe beyond comprehension. The financial
ValuJet tragedy will be on shareholder value.
consequences may also turn out to be catastrophic
However the prognosis emerging from this study is
for the relatively young airline. The study of the
bleak. ValuJet bears all the hallmarks of a “non-
financial consequences of catastrophes may seem
recoverer”. Firstly, the shareholder value lost in the
morbid. However, catastrophes are phenomena
first few days was massive, amounting to about 35%
which provide a unique opportunity to evaluate how
of market capitalisation - putting it on a similar scale
financial markets respond when major risks become
to Union Carbide’s Bhopal incident. Secondly, the
potential cash flow impact is enormous - probably inthe region of $308 million. Thirdly, there were a high
In formulating risk management policies, corporate
number of fatalities: all 110 passengers and crew
managers have to evaluate alternative strategies
members perished. Finally, it appears that
against the criterion of shareholder value
management will be judged to be at least partially
maximisation. Thus, a decision to hedge against
responsible for the safety lapse. All of these four
certain types of risk should hinge on whether the
factors have been identified as key determinants
value of the firm is higher or lower under hedging. In
governing the shareholder value response to
order to assess the benefits of catastrophe insurance
in value terms, a deeper insight is called for into howcatastrophes affect shareholder value and how the
This briefing aims to identify the impact of
existence of catastrophe insurance influences their
catastrophes by focusing on fifteen major corporate
impact. Preliminary findings indicate that the impact
catastrophes and tracing their impact on shareholder
of catastrophes on shareholder value is not strongly
value. As would be expected, in all cases the
influenced by the existence of catastrophe insurance.
catastrophe had a significant negative initial impact
Catastrophes appear to affect value in rather complex
on shareholder value. Figure 1 shows the average
ways which seem to result in a re-evaluation of
impact of all the catastrophes on shareholder value.
management - which may be positive or negative.
But after a sharp initial negative impact amounting to
This result is largely consistent with modern financial
almost 8% of shareholder value, there is on average
theory which suggests that shareholder value is
an apparent full recovery in just over fifty trading
based on ex ante risk assessments in the context of
days. This suggests that the net impact on
large portfolios. In such a setting, much of the
shareholder value is negligible. However, as will be
idiosyncratic risk associated with a particular
shown below, the ability to recover the lost
company is diversified away. Further hedging of risk
shareholder value over the long-term variesconsiderably between firms.
Figure 1: Impact of Catastrophes on Shareholder Value (Full Sample)
In addition to the direct impact on shareholder value,
down to normal levels around a month afterwards.
catastrophes also have a highly significant impact on
Thus, the immediate and negative impact on value
the level of trading in shares. Figure 2 shows that
not surprisingly coincides with abnormally high levels
trading in shares in these corporations is more than
of trading activity. By contrast, the drift back in
four times the usual level in the days immediately
shareholder value occurs at a normal level of trading
after the catastrophe. On average, trading settles
Figure 2: The Impact of Catastrophes on Share Trading Volume
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of catastrophes on the
after the event. This result suggests that no
volatility of share returns indicating that, although
significant sustained impact on share volatility is
volatility increases initially, it does settle down soon
Figure 3: The Impact of Catastrophes on Share Volatility
2. Why do some firms recover from loss in shareholder value better
Interestingly, firms affected by catastrophes fall into
impact on shareholder value for the recoverers was
two relatively distinct groups - recoverers and non-
5% plus. So the net impact on shareholder value by
recoverers. The initial loss of shareholder value is
this stage was actually positive. The non-recoverers
approximately 5% on average for recoverers and
remained more or less unchanged between days 5
about 11% for non-recoverers. Figure 4 shows that
and 50 but suffered a net negative cumulative impact
by the fiftieth trading day, the average cumulative
of almost 15% up to one year after the catastrophe.
Figure 5: Trading Volume of Recoverers vs Non-Recoverers
Why would some catastrophes lead to an increase in
shareholder value? One explanation from ourresearch is that there are two elements to the
catastrophic impact. The first is the immediate
estimate of the associated economic loss. Thesecond hinges on management’s ability to deal withthe aftermath. Although all catastrophes have an
initial negative impact on value, paradoxically theyoffer an opportunity for management to demonstrate
their talent in dealing with difficult circumstances.
Effective management of the consequences of
catastrophes would appear to be a more significantfactor than whether catastrophe insurance hedges
the economic impact of the catastrophe. Figure 5shows that the abnormal trading (shown earlier in
figure 2) is predominately caused by non-recoverers.
Thus, an absence of frenetic trading around the time
of a catastrophe is usually associated with asubsequent recovery in shareholder value.
Interestingly, the research reveals that the volatilityimpact is almost identical for both recoverers and
The essential distinctions between recoverers andnon-recoverers appear to be that:
negative response of over 10% of marketcapitalisation.
In the first two or three months the magnitudeof the estimated financial loss is significant
There is a large number of fatalities. Thisseems to govern recovery in the first two or
responsibility for accident or safety lapsesappears to explain the shareholder value
By contrast, whether the losses were fully coveredby insurance does not appear to have much influence.
3. What are the implications for the insurance markets?
This research presents evidence which suggests that
The results of this study suggest that it is the
a firm’s recovery of shareholder value immediately
indirect factors which dominate the impact of
following a catastrophic loss is independent of the
catastrophes on shareholder value. The net financial
presence of insurance cover. This raises interesting
loss has a relatively minor impact on the full change
issues for the consumers (companies) and the
of shareholder value associated with catastrophes.
providers (insurers and brokers) of risk managementservices.
The message is clear: catastrophe insurance cover isno protection against the shareholder value effects of
The empirical results we present suggest that the
catastrophes. This suggests that a company’s
impact of a catastrophe on shareholder value derives
insurance strategy should not be considered in
from two sets of factors. The first is the direct
isolation and should not be viewed as a substitute for
financial consequences of the catastrophe. What will
high quality risk management and contingency
be the impact of the catastrophe on the firm’s future
cash flows? Although the cash flow impact is notknown with certainty at the time of the catastrophe,
The results further suggest that there may be
the stock market will form a collective opinion and
considerable demand from the corporate sector for
adjust value accordingly. These direct factors will
the unbundling of traditional insurance products in
usually have a negative impact on shareholder value,
future. Frequently the insurance premium paid by a
but this impact will be cushioned by the extent to
corporate includes a fairly modest element to cover a
which insurance recoveries reduce the cash
catastrophic loss, the balance of the premium relating
to claims handling and management services. Inaddition there appear to be significant opportunities
The second set of factors are what may be described
on the supply side for the insurance providers to
as the indirect factors. These factors have an impact
expand their services in the latter end, namely by
on shareholder value which springs from what
providing more extensive risk management and
catastrophes reveal about management skills not
catastrophe management services. There appears
hitherto reflected in value. A re-evaluation of
from these results to be considerable value adding
management by the stock market is likely to result in
a re-assessment of the firm’s future cash flows interms of both magnitude and confidence. This in
An unbundling of the insurance products would allow
turn would have potentially large implications for
firms to disentangle their decision to insure losses
shareholder value. Management is placed in the
from their decision to purchase risk management
spotlight and has an opportunity to demonstrate its
skill or otherwise in an extreme situation. Theindirect factors are therefore able to have a large
The results suggest that the financial loss is a small
negative or positive impact on value.
part of the value effects of a catastrophe. The crispissues facing management are:
The combined effect of the two sets of factors couldtherefore be either positive or negative: positive in
1. Is the insurance cover value for money?
circumstances where the benefits of what is revealed
2. Is there any value in outsourcing the management
about management outweigh the net financial loss of
the catastrophe; unfavourable if the revelation effectsare negative, since this will amplify the negative
The varying responses to these issues will shape the
The value of insuring the financial loss is being
1 In some circumstances the impact could be positive.
questioned seriously by many firms. What are the
For example, where the demand for a firm’s products
benefits to well diversified shareholders who also
increases (with the attendant increase in cash flow)
hold shares in insurance companies? At best a zero-
as a result of consumer sympathy flowing from the
sum game perhaps? There are unlikely to be any free
catastrophe. In the context of the current
lunches on offer from the insurance industry. British
classification such effects should be defined as
Petroleum’s historic decision to retain the bulk of its
indirect, ie within the second set of factors.
exposures, including catastrophe exposure, is an
been to move progressively away from a transaction-
example of this logic. Interestingly, BP management
based culture, with remuneration by brokerage,
continues to purchase risk management services
towards the provision of an increasingly wide range
from the insurance industry. The results presented
of risk management, insurance and consultancy
here seem to indicate that more corporates may
services, remunerated by fees for work undertaken
and added-value provided. These results support thewisdom of such a strategy.
Another trend evident in the last decade has been forlarge industrial corporations to adopt captive and/or
Finally, an additional response to the changing
self-insurance whilst continuing to purchase
patterns of behaviour seen recently in the commercial
catastrophe insurance cover. This is in sharp
insurance markets has been the establishment of
contrast to the BP philosophy in that these
Bermuda-based catastrophe reinsurance ventures. In
corporates have perceived value in the cover but not
1992-93 these companies attracted more than US$4
the service. This presents the insurance industry
billion of capital in the private and public markets.
with considerable opportunities and threats.
Recent years have seen also a marked growth in
Considering the results of the study it is likely that
hybrid funding mechanisms such as the catastrophe
the opportunities could be larger than the threats for
futures and options traded in Chicago. It is possible
that these new instruments will have otherramifications for post-catastrophe share price
On the supply side, the response of the global
brokers to the changes in the purchasing and riskmanagement philosophy of their major clients has
The selection of corporate catastrophes whichfollows is based on four criteria:
In addition, in each case the organisation is affected
Each involves a publicly-quoted company.
on a symbolic level as well as on a physical level.
Moreover, this symbolic impact affects the whole
Each has received headline coverage in world
organisation and is not limited to a self-contained
Six of the disasters profiled were in the oil/
the results of Lloyd’s of London, the largest single
petrochemical/chemical industries, and six were
provider of catastrophe insurance world-wide. Eight
product-related incidents. Overall, four events were
of the companies are American and the remaining six
attributable to deliberate acts of tampering or
are European - British, Dutch, French and Swiss.
terrorism, and in a further two sabotage was
Thus, this catastrophe portfolio is international and
suspected. Eight of the fifteen catastrophes occurred
constitutes a representative sample across industries
during the period 1988-90, which is consistent with
and across the major classes of loss world-wide.
Soon after taking off from Miami Atlanta-bound
It is believed that an employee or former employee of
ValuJet DC-9 592 crashed into the Florida
McNeilab, Inc - a unit of Johnson & Johnson -
Everglades. Although the exact cause of the crash is
injected cyanide into Tylenol (acetaminophen/
unknown, investigators believe that a fire broke outin the forward cargo hold, which was carrying aconsignment of inflammable airline oxygengenerators and tyres, and that this fire was intenseenough to break through to the passenger cabin.
110 people were killed: all 105 passengers and 5 crewmembers on board. On 13 May Standard & Poor’splaced ValuJet’s “BB” corporate credit rating and“BB-” senior unsecured rating on CreditWatch withnegative implications, owing to the potential for lostpassenger revenue. On 18 May ValuJet cut itsnumber of flights - normally 320 daily - by half tocheck the safety of its aircraft. The hull value of the27-year-old DC-9 aircraft is US$4m, for which
paracetamol) extra-strength pain relieving capsules.
Seven people died of cyanide poisoning; all victims inthe Chicago area. 31m bottles of Tylenol capsuleswere recalled, examined and destroyed. Sales ofextra-strength Tylenol capsules were stopped andadvertising halted. On 13 May 1991, the families ofthe seven victims reached an out-of-court settlement,the amount of which was not disclosed. On 13January 1983, Johnson & Johnson sued its insurersUS$67.4m in liability claims for the cost of recall -estimated at US$100m - and US$50m for businessinterruption losses. Johnson & Johnson insures thefirst US$5m of its product liability exposure throughits captive insurer, Middlesex Assurance Company.
On 22 September 1986, a US federal judge ruled that
ValuJet is insured. It is estimated that ValuJet may
Johnson & Johnson’s product liability insurance did
have to pay as much as US$300m in liability claims;
not cover the costs associated with the Tylenol
the company has liability insurance totalling
US$750m for any one occurrence. By 20 MayValuJet had refunded approximately US$4.1m topassengers whose flights were cancelled or whosetravel plans had changed as a result of the disaster.
The maximum total cost of the air crash is estimatedat US$308.1m.
Poor safety measures, the storage of large quantities
A woman died in Bronxville, New York, after taking
of lethal gas (methyl isocyanate) at the wrong
cyanide-impregnated Tylenol (acetaminophen/
temperature, the accidental or deliberate introduction
paracetamol) capsules. On 12 February 1986, the
of water to one of the gas storage tanks, confusion in
United States suspended sales of Tylenol capsules,
detecting a rise in pressure in the tank and ineffectiveresponse to its detection - all these factors arebelieved to be responsible for the gas leak tragedy atUnion Carbide’s chemical plant in Bhopal, India.
Union Carbide has always refused to accept fullresponsibility for the disaster - though it accepted“moral responsibility” from the outset - maintainingthat sabotage by a disgruntled employee was themain cause of the disaster. The actual death tollfrom the Bhopal tragedy is undetermined. The mostaccurate estimate appears to be that over 3,000people died and over 300,000 were injured. About2,000 animals are estimated to have died and 7,000were injured severely. Vegetation was destroyed insurrounding areas. Many people exposed to the gaswill face a lifetime of ill-health with eye and lungdisorders. Known costs, including liability chargesand payments to build hospitals, exceed US$527m.
By 12 March 1991 Union Carbide had collectedUS$167m in insurance from the disaster.
and on 3 March 1986 the sale of the drug was haltedin a further 14 countries. On 17 November 1988 aUnited States district judge ruled that neitherJohnson & Johnson nor the grocery which sold thecyanide-laced capsules was liable, and acquitted thecompanies of negligence. The cost of the recall isestimated at US$150m.
It is alleged that the fire and explosion at thechemical warehouse of Sandoz at Schweizerhalle inBasle, Switzerland was probably caused by the use ofa flame to shrink-wrap plastic covers around palletsof paint. These may have smouldered for severalhours before bursting into flame. Sandoz believesthe fire may have been the result of an arson attack.
Fourteen people were injured and a cloud ofpoisonous gas was released into the atmosphere.
Water used to fight the fire washed 30 tonnes oftoxic chemicals into the River Rhine, turning it red
The Herald of Free Enterprise roll-on roll-off car ferrysailed from Zeebrugge harbour with its inner andouter bow doors open. It capsized and sank as adirect result of water rushing through its open bowdoors. 192 people drowned: 154 passengers and 38crew out of a total 454 passengers and 80 crew.
Known legal costs total US$70m, but some activelawsuits remain.
The Norco refinery and chemical plant exploded afterhydrocarbon gas escaped from a corroded pipe in a
and killing thousands of fish. Loss of the warehouseand the 800 tonnes of chemicals which were storedinside is estimated at US$12m, with an additionalUS$6m required for clean-up of the warehouse. Forthese damages Sandoz is covered by insurance. It isestimated that Sandoz will pay US$67m in liabilityclaims. The company is believed to have liabilityinsurance totalling between US$67m and US$325m.
Herald of Free Enterprise SinkingP&O, 6 March 1987
catalytic cracker and was ignited. Louisiana statepolice evacuated 2,800 residents from nearbyneighbourhoods. Seven workers were killed and 42injured. The total cost arising from the Norco blastis estimated at US$706m, comprising US$490m toreplace the cracker and US$216m in liability claims.
Shell is believed to be fully insured for the event.
the bombing was ordered by Iran and the bomb was
planted by Libya with the connivance of Syria.
Relatives of those killed in the crash have filed suit
At 9.45 pm on the day of the explosion one of two
against Pan Am. A few lawsuits have been settled
condensate injection pumps failed on the Piper Alpha
but many remain active. Following the verdictagainst Pan Am of “wilful misconduct”, UnitedStates Aviation Insurance Group (USAIG) revised itsoriginal estimate of liability claims from US$250m toUS$470m in total (21 February 1994). The hull ofthe aircraft was insured for US$32m. On 21December 1989, Pan Am estimated that it hadsuffered a revenue shortfall of US$150m in lostbookings as a result of the disaster, bringing theestimated total cost to US$652m.
oil platform in the North Sea, 120 miles east of Wick,north east Scotland. The other pump had been shutdown for maintenance and, unaware of its condition,workers are assumed to have restarted it. Thisresulted in a leak of condensate, creating a smallexplosion which knocked out safety equipment, and aseries of major blasts caused a fireball. At 10.20 pm,the gas pipeline riser fractured, leading to a massiveexplosion and the collapse of the drilling derrick. 167workers died. The bodies of 31 were never
recovered. Only 63 people survived. The principal
cause of death was smoke inhalation and a few died
The fully loaded United States supertanker Exxon
of burns. The total financial cost of the disaster is
Valdez, ran aground in the Gulf of Alaska. It was
manoeuvering through heavy ice when it ran intoBligh Reef, puncturing 8 of its 13 cargo tanks andspilling 11m gallons of crude oil into Prince William
Sound. 1,500 miles of pristine shoreline were
polluted, more wildlife was killed than in any otherindustrial accident and Alaskan natives, particularly
A terrorist bomb exploded aboard Pan Am Boeing
fishermen, suffered long term harm to their
747 Flight 103 causing the aircraft to crash. The
livelihoods and subsistence way of life. The latest
bomb exploded over the Scottish market town of
estimate for the total cost of the oil spill is over
Lockerbie, about 55 minutes after taking off from
US$11.5bn (7 October 1994). This figure comprises
Heathrow. 270 people were killed; all 243 passengers
US$8.7bn in damages, US$2.5bn already paid
and 16 crew on board, and 11 people on the ground.
towards the clean-up operation and US$316.5m paid
On 21 December 1993, investigations revealed that
to victims of the accident. It appears that the
International Tanker Owners Indemnity Association
Adverse side-effects, including confusion, agitation,
provided US$400m of pollution insurance cover for
hallucinations, paranoia, amnesia and aggressive
the “Exxon Valdez” and reinsured about US$388m in
behaviour are alleged to result from taking the
Lloyd’s and member companies of the Institute of
prescription drug, Halcion - Upjohn’s brand-name for
benzodiazepine hypnotic triazolam. On 3 October1991, the FDA approved the drug, reporting that the“benefits outweighed its risks”. Although Upjohnhas settled some cases, the company still faceshundreds of lawsuits over the drug. Marketing ofHalcion remains suspended in Britain, Norway,Argentina and Brazil. Known legal costs includethose for the “Grundberg case”, a US$21m claimwhere Upjohn settled out of court for an undisclosedamount, and US$2m for a another case.
Pasadena ExplosionPhillips Petroleum, 23 October 1989
Halcion Side-EffectsUpjohn, 19 September 1989
The explosion occurred after a seal on a polyethylenereactor ruptured, leaking highly inflammable ethyleneand isobutane gas from a pipeline. It is unclear whatignited the gas. The fire blazed for more than eighthours before being brought under control and, withthe explosion, caused extensive damage to half thepetrochemical facility. 23 people were killed and 130injured. Total costs arising from the disaster areestimated at US$1,300m.
Violent secondary effects are alleged to result fromtaking the prescription anti-depressant drug, Prozac -Lilly’s brand-name for fluoxetine hydrochloride. On20 September 1991, the United States federal Foodand Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committeeissued a favourable verdict on Prozac, finding no linkbetween the drug and suicide. Numerous lawsuitshave been filed against Lilly, alleging that Prozac hasdriven people to murder another, suicide and otherforms of violence. None has been successful to date,although several are still pending.
The natural gas present in the Perrier spring atVergeze in the Gard, southern France contains anumber of impurities. The carbon filters whichshould have removed these impurities, includingcancer-inducing benzene, had become clogged. Afaulty warning light on the control panel wentundetected by employees for more than six months,allowing the filters to become blocked. When themineral water was found to be contaminated bybenzene, 160m bottles were recalled from 120countries. The bottles were destroyed and replaced.
Nobody suffered as a result of drinking the benzene-infected water. The Perrier group estimated that“l’incident Benzene” had cost it US$262.9m:US$197.5m for recalling and destroying the bottles,US$47.7m for related advertising communication,consultants and financial charges, and US$17.7m forassociated administration charges. Perrier did nothave product guarantee and recall insurance.
Defective glass, manufactured by BSN’s VereenigdeGlas, was used to make export beer bottles. Whenopened or transported, glass splinters could fall intothe beer. Heineken recalled, destroyed and replaced15.4 million bottles. Nobody was injured as a resultof the glass splinters. At the time of occurrence,Heineken estimated the loss to be anything between$10m and $50m. It was unclear whether Heineken’sproduct liability insurance policy would cover thelosses. Coverage is unlikely, given the small marketfor product recall in Europe. On 14 April 1994Vereenigde Glas agreed to compensate Heineken foran undisclosed sum.
A bomb, planted by the IRA, exploded in London’sfinancial district. The 45kg bomb was placed in a caroutside the Baltic Exchange which, together with theCommercial Union (CU) tower which accommodatesthe company’s headquarters, bore the brunt of theexplosion. Hundreds of CU’s computers werewrecked, 2,000 panes of glass were smashed and thetower was rendered useless for a year. Three peoplewere killed and 91 injured. On 19 April 1992 totalcosts were estimated at US$2,170m, comprisingUS$560m rebuilding costs, US$560m businessinterruption claims, and US$1,050m in repairs tocomputer links, roads and a church.
In order to isolate the effect of the catastrophe on
time series regression of the return on stock i (R ) on
shareholder value, it is necessary to rule out the
the return on the market portfolio (R ). In this way,
effect of other events that may impact on shareholder
the results are controlled for market-wide influences.
value simultaneously. In this study, this isaccomplished in two phases. The first phase is at the
The abnormal returns for each firm are accumulated
individual company level and involves the filtering
out of share price movements and the effects of
market-wide factors. The result of this process is the
estimation of so-called abnormal returns for a period
immediately after the catastrophe. In the secondphase, the abnormal returns are aligned on the
catastrophe (day 0) and averaged across the total
CAR = cumulative abnormal return on portfolio p on
sample. These average abnormal returns are then
day t, relative to the day of the catastrophe (t = 0).
accumulated over what is now catastrophe time,resulting in a set of portfolio returns from day 0
N = the number of corporate catastrophes in portfolio
known as cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The
second phase filters out any company-specific effects
In addition to examining the direct impact of the
catastrophe on shareholder value, figures 2 and 3
Figures 1 and 4 show the CARs for portfolios of the
report the impact on trading volume and volatility
total sample and the portfolios of recoverers and
respectively. The metric to evaluate the impact on
non-recoverers. The CAR charts reflect the impact
trading volume is defined relative to the average
on shareholder value in percentage terms.
More formally , the abnormal return on share i on
TV = trading volume of share i on day t.
ATV = 12 month average trading volume of share i,
over event months -6 to 0 and 1 to 7.
UTV was calculated for each share for the first
month following the event. It is assumed that
whereas a corporate catastrophe may affect stockprice behaviour throughout the entire post-event
year, any impact on trading activity will be evidentprimarily in the first post-event month only.
The expected return is modelled via a model of theform:
Volatility is measured as the volatility in the daily
share returns over a two year interval surrounding
the catastrophe. These were then averaged across
R = the return on the market portfolio on day t.
Pre-event and post-event variances were calculatedfor each catastrophe as follows:
The model parameters, a and b , represent the
intercept and slope coefficient respectively, estimated
from a market model regression of the following form:
The risk-adjustment procedure is based on the well-
n = the number of trading days in the event window.
known Capital Asset Pricing Model. The systematicrisk parameter, beta, is calculated for each individual
The raw data on share prices, trading volume and
company, and is equal to the slope coefficient in a
market capitalisation underlying this study were
market index chosen varies according to the market
obtained from the Datastream financial database.
in which the shares are traded. Since the abnormal
The data are daily and relate to trading days. The
returns on all shares are measured in real terms, their
analysis is conducted relative to a common event
additivity across numeraires appeals to Purchasing
time, rather than in calendar time. In the case of
Power Parity. Table 2 indicates the market index
each catastrophe, abnormal returns are calculated in
the local currency of the parent company, and the
Data on trading volume were unavailable for Sandoz
All other data were obtained from the annual reports
and Perrier. Consequently, the catastrophe portfolio
and accounts of the portfolio companies, and from
comprises 13 catastrophes where trading volume is
Reuters Textline, the international newspaper and
analysed. On days where there was no trading, the
data points were removed from the analysis and theaverage figures were adjusted accordingly.
1 The financial and operating results of Shell Oil Inc are
prices and trading volume were chosen to represent Shell
integrated into the consolidated accounts of Royal Dutch
Oil in the analysis. Consolidated Group figures were used in
Petroleum Company and The Shell Transport and Trading
calculations of market capitalisation.
Company plc (henceforth “Shell”), where the former owns
60% of the Group concern and Shell owns the remaining
2 Daily index figures for the Paris Bourse were unavailable.
40%. As expected, the share price behaviour of Royal
Consequently, weekly figures were used and it was assumed
Dutch and Shell were found to be highly correlated; R2 =
that the market index did not fluctuate during the week.
0.995. Consequently, for ease of data access, Shell share
Dr Knight has extensive experience of working in the
Deborah Pretty took her first degree in Industrial
financial sector. He has also held chairs in the
Economics and is now working in the field of risk
University of Cape Town and in the International
finance. Her previous experience includes risk
Management Institute, Geneva (now IMD).
management consultancy on risk retention strategies
Immediately before coming to Oxford he was the
and alternative risk finance; writing and editing risk-
Deputy Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies,
related articles for professional and trade journals;
a foundation within the Swiss National Bank (the
and involvement in corporate strategic planning,
central bank of Switzerland) - an institute with which
marketing; and risk management education and
he retains an active association. He is a visiting
training. Immediately before beginning her doctorate,
professor at a number of universities around the
she was Project Manager with Sedgwick Energy &
world including Ecole Nationale des Ponts et
Marine Limited (risk advisers and insurance brokers)
Chaussées (Paris), INSEAD (Paris), EOI (Madrid),
who are sponsoring her research. Previously, she
was a risk finance analyst with Tillinghast (actuarial
University of Cape Town. Dr Knight is also
programme director of the Oxford AdvancedManagement Programme.
Her special interests include: Corporate RiskManagement Strategy; Economics of Insurance;
His special interests include: Corporate and Financial
Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) Techniques;
Strategy; International Investments and Corporate
Strategic Planning; Risk Perception and Analysis;
Finance; Currency Risk Management; Joint Ventures;
Crisis Management; Financial Modelling.
Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Ownership andGovernance; International Capital and ExchangeMarkets.
LES INFILTRATIONS DEFINITION Sens strict = injections intra articulaires d’un corticoïde. Définition élargie : « infiltrations » = toutes lesinjections locales d’un dérivé corticoïde. Exclut les injections systémiques de corticoïdes : LES QUESTIONS ÿ Diagnostic au moins lésionnel. ÿ traitement validé par la communautéÿ hiérarchie thérapeutique. ÿ contre-ind
Core Content In Urgent Care Medicine GI/GU Module Release Date: December 1, 2009 Review Date: January 31, 2011 Expiration Date: November 30, 2014 Urinary Tract Infections Faculty: William Gluckman, DO, MBA, FACEP 1. The most common organism causing urinary tract infections is: a. Staph Saprophyticus b. Enterococcus c. Proteus mirabilis d. Escherichia coli 2. Whic