The impact of catastrophes on shareholder value

A Research Report Sponsored by Sedgwick Group Templeton College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 5NY, England Tel +44 (0)1865 422500 Fax +44 (0)1865 422501 On 11 May, at around two pm Eastern time, ValuJet by management may be redundant from the view of DC-9 Flight 592 bound for Atlanta crashed into the Florida Everglades soon after take-off from Miami.
All passengers and crew perished. This was a human It is too early to say what the full effect of the catastrophe beyond comprehension. The financial ValuJet tragedy will be on shareholder value.
consequences may also turn out to be catastrophic However the prognosis emerging from this study is for the relatively young airline. The study of the bleak. ValuJet bears all the hallmarks of a “non- financial consequences of catastrophes may seem recoverer”. Firstly, the shareholder value lost in the morbid. However, catastrophes are phenomena first few days was massive, amounting to about 35% which provide a unique opportunity to evaluate how of market capitalisation - putting it on a similar scale financial markets respond when major risks become to Union Carbide’s Bhopal incident. Secondly, the potential cash flow impact is enormous - probably inthe region of $308 million. Thirdly, there were a high In formulating risk management policies, corporate number of fatalities: all 110 passengers and crew managers have to evaluate alternative strategies members perished. Finally, it appears that against the criterion of shareholder value management will be judged to be at least partially maximisation. Thus, a decision to hedge against responsible for the safety lapse. All of these four certain types of risk should hinge on whether the factors have been identified as key determinants value of the firm is higher or lower under hedging. In governing the shareholder value response to order to assess the benefits of catastrophe insurance in value terms, a deeper insight is called for into howcatastrophes affect shareholder value and how the This briefing aims to identify the impact of existence of catastrophe insurance influences their catastrophes by focusing on fifteen major corporate impact. Preliminary findings indicate that the impact catastrophes and tracing their impact on shareholder of catastrophes on shareholder value is not strongly value. As would be expected, in all cases the influenced by the existence of catastrophe insurance.
catastrophe had a significant negative initial impact Catastrophes appear to affect value in rather complex on shareholder value. Figure 1 shows the average ways which seem to result in a re-evaluation of impact of all the catastrophes on shareholder value.
management - which may be positive or negative.
But after a sharp initial negative impact amounting to This result is largely consistent with modern financial almost 8% of shareholder value, there is on average theory which suggests that shareholder value is an apparent full recovery in just over fifty trading based on ex ante risk assessments in the context of days. This suggests that the net impact on large portfolios. In such a setting, much of the shareholder value is negligible. However, as will be idiosyncratic risk associated with a particular shown below, the ability to recover the lost company is diversified away. Further hedging of risk shareholder value over the long-term variesconsiderably between firms.
Figure 1: Impact of Catastrophes on Shareholder Value (Full Sample) In addition to the direct impact on shareholder value, down to normal levels around a month afterwards.
catastrophes also have a highly significant impact on Thus, the immediate and negative impact on value the level of trading in shares. Figure 2 shows that not surprisingly coincides with abnormally high levels trading in shares in these corporations is more than of trading activity. By contrast, the drift back in four times the usual level in the days immediately shareholder value occurs at a normal level of trading after the catastrophe. On average, trading settles Figure 2: The Impact of Catastrophes on Share Trading Volume Figure 3 illustrates the impact of catastrophes on the after the event. This result suggests that no volatility of share returns indicating that, although significant sustained impact on share volatility is volatility increases initially, it does settle down soon Figure 3: The Impact of Catastrophes on Share Volatility 2. Why do some firms recover from loss in shareholder value better Interestingly, firms affected by catastrophes fall into impact on shareholder value for the recoverers was two relatively distinct groups - recoverers and non- 5% plus. So the net impact on shareholder value by recoverers. The initial loss of shareholder value is this stage was actually positive. The non-recoverers approximately 5% on average for recoverers and remained more or less unchanged between days 5 about 11% for non-recoverers. Figure 4 shows that and 50 but suffered a net negative cumulative impact by the fiftieth trading day, the average cumulative of almost 15% up to one year after the catastrophe.
Figure 5: Trading Volume of Recoverers vs Non-Recoverers Why would some catastrophes lead to an increase in shareholder value? One explanation from ourresearch is that there are two elements to the catastrophic impact. The first is the immediate estimate of the associated economic loss. Thesecond hinges on management’s ability to deal withthe aftermath. Although all catastrophes have an initial negative impact on value, paradoxically theyoffer an opportunity for management to demonstrate their talent in dealing with difficult circumstances.
Effective management of the consequences of catastrophes would appear to be a more significantfactor than whether catastrophe insurance hedges the economic impact of the catastrophe. Figure 5shows that the abnormal trading (shown earlier in figure 2) is predominately caused by non-recoverers.
Thus, an absence of frenetic trading around the time of a catastrophe is usually associated with asubsequent recovery in shareholder value.
Interestingly, the research reveals that the volatilityimpact is almost identical for both recoverers and The essential distinctions between recoverers andnon-recoverers appear to be that: negative response of over 10% of marketcapitalisation.
In the first two or three months the magnitudeof the estimated financial loss is significant There is a large number of fatalities. Thisseems to govern recovery in the first two or responsibility for accident or safety lapsesappears to explain the shareholder value By contrast, whether the losses were fully coveredby insurance does not appear to have much influence.
3. What are the implications for the insurance markets? This research presents evidence which suggests that The results of this study suggest that it is the a firm’s recovery of shareholder value immediately indirect factors which dominate the impact of following a catastrophic loss is independent of the catastrophes on shareholder value. The net financial presence of insurance cover. This raises interesting loss has a relatively minor impact on the full change issues for the consumers (companies) and the of shareholder value associated with catastrophes.
providers (insurers and brokers) of risk managementservices.
The message is clear: catastrophe insurance cover isno protection against the shareholder value effects of The empirical results we present suggest that the catastrophes. This suggests that a company’s impact of a catastrophe on shareholder value derives insurance strategy should not be considered in from two sets of factors. The first is the direct isolation and should not be viewed as a substitute for financial consequences of the catastrophe. What will high quality risk management and contingency be the impact of the catastrophe on the firm’s future cash flows? Although the cash flow impact is notknown with certainty at the time of the catastrophe, The results further suggest that there may be the stock market will form a collective opinion and considerable demand from the corporate sector for adjust value accordingly. These direct factors will the unbundling of traditional insurance products in usually have a negative impact on shareholder value, future. Frequently the insurance premium paid by a but this impact will be cushioned by the extent to corporate includes a fairly modest element to cover a which insurance recoveries reduce the cash catastrophic loss, the balance of the premium relating to claims handling and management services. Inaddition there appear to be significant opportunities The second set of factors are what may be described on the supply side for the insurance providers to as the indirect factors. These factors have an impact expand their services in the latter end, namely by on shareholder value which springs from what providing more extensive risk management and catastrophes reveal about management skills not catastrophe management services. There appears hitherto reflected in value. A re-evaluation of from these results to be considerable value adding management by the stock market is likely to result in a re-assessment of the firm’s future cash flows interms of both magnitude and confidence. This in An unbundling of the insurance products would allow turn would have potentially large implications for firms to disentangle their decision to insure losses shareholder value. Management is placed in the from their decision to purchase risk management spotlight and has an opportunity to demonstrate its skill or otherwise in an extreme situation. Theindirect factors are therefore able to have a large The results suggest that the financial loss is a small negative or positive impact on value.
part of the value effects of a catastrophe. The crispissues facing management are: The combined effect of the two sets of factors couldtherefore be either positive or negative: positive in 1. Is the insurance cover value for money? circumstances where the benefits of what is revealed 2. Is there any value in outsourcing the management about management outweigh the net financial loss of the catastrophe; unfavourable if the revelation effectsare negative, since this will amplify the negative The varying responses to these issues will shape the The value of insuring the financial loss is being 1 In some circumstances the impact could be positive.
questioned seriously by many firms. What are the For example, where the demand for a firm’s products benefits to well diversified shareholders who also increases (with the attendant increase in cash flow) hold shares in insurance companies? At best a zero- as a result of consumer sympathy flowing from the sum game perhaps? There are unlikely to be any free catastrophe. In the context of the current lunches on offer from the insurance industry. British classification such effects should be defined as Petroleum’s historic decision to retain the bulk of its indirect, ie within the second set of factors.
exposures, including catastrophe exposure, is an been to move progressively away from a transaction- example of this logic. Interestingly, BP management based culture, with remuneration by brokerage, continues to purchase risk management services towards the provision of an increasingly wide range from the insurance industry. The results presented of risk management, insurance and consultancy here seem to indicate that more corporates may services, remunerated by fees for work undertaken and added-value provided. These results support thewisdom of such a strategy.
Another trend evident in the last decade has been forlarge industrial corporations to adopt captive and/or Finally, an additional response to the changing self-insurance whilst continuing to purchase patterns of behaviour seen recently in the commercial catastrophe insurance cover. This is in sharp insurance markets has been the establishment of contrast to the BP philosophy in that these Bermuda-based catastrophe reinsurance ventures. In corporates have perceived value in the cover but not 1992-93 these companies attracted more than US$4 the service. This presents the insurance industry billion of capital in the private and public markets.
with considerable opportunities and threats.
Recent years have seen also a marked growth in Considering the results of the study it is likely that hybrid funding mechanisms such as the catastrophe the opportunities could be larger than the threats for futures and options traded in Chicago. It is possible that these new instruments will have otherramifications for post-catastrophe share price On the supply side, the response of the global brokers to the changes in the purchasing and riskmanagement philosophy of their major clients has The selection of corporate catastrophes whichfollows is based on four criteria: In addition, in each case the organisation is affected Each involves a publicly-quoted company.
on a symbolic level as well as on a physical level.
Moreover, this symbolic impact affects the whole Each has received headline coverage in world organisation and is not limited to a self-contained Six of the disasters profiled were in the oil/ the results of Lloyd’s of London, the largest single petrochemical/chemical industries, and six were provider of catastrophe insurance world-wide. Eight product-related incidents. Overall, four events were of the companies are American and the remaining six attributable to deliberate acts of tampering or are European - British, Dutch, French and Swiss.
terrorism, and in a further two sabotage was Thus, this catastrophe portfolio is international and suspected. Eight of the fifteen catastrophes occurred constitutes a representative sample across industries during the period 1988-90, which is consistent with and across the major classes of loss world-wide.
Soon after taking off from Miami Atlanta-bound It is believed that an employee or former employee of ValuJet DC-9 592 crashed into the Florida McNeilab, Inc - a unit of Johnson & Johnson - Everglades. Although the exact cause of the crash is injected cyanide into Tylenol (acetaminophen/ unknown, investigators believe that a fire broke outin the forward cargo hold, which was carrying aconsignment of inflammable airline oxygengenerators and tyres, and that this fire was intenseenough to break through to the passenger cabin.
110 people were killed: all 105 passengers and 5 crewmembers on board. On 13 May Standard & Poor’splaced ValuJet’s “BB” corporate credit rating and“BB-” senior unsecured rating on CreditWatch withnegative implications, owing to the potential for lostpassenger revenue. On 18 May ValuJet cut itsnumber of flights - normally 320 daily - by half tocheck the safety of its aircraft. The hull value of the27-year-old DC-9 aircraft is US$4m, for which paracetamol) extra-strength pain relieving capsules.
Seven people died of cyanide poisoning; all victims inthe Chicago area. 31m bottles of Tylenol capsuleswere recalled, examined and destroyed. Sales ofextra-strength Tylenol capsules were stopped andadvertising halted. On 13 May 1991, the families ofthe seven victims reached an out-of-court settlement,the amount of which was not disclosed. On 13January 1983, Johnson & Johnson sued its insurersUS$67.4m in liability claims for the cost of recall -estimated at US$100m - and US$50m for businessinterruption losses. Johnson & Johnson insures thefirst US$5m of its product liability exposure throughits captive insurer, Middlesex Assurance Company.
On 22 September 1986, a US federal judge ruled that ValuJet is insured. It is estimated that ValuJet may Johnson & Johnson’s product liability insurance did have to pay as much as US$300m in liability claims; not cover the costs associated with the Tylenol the company has liability insurance totalling US$750m for any one occurrence. By 20 MayValuJet had refunded approximately US$4.1m topassengers whose flights were cancelled or whosetravel plans had changed as a result of the disaster.
The maximum total cost of the air crash is estimatedat US$308.1m.
Poor safety measures, the storage of large quantities A woman died in Bronxville, New York, after taking of lethal gas (methyl isocyanate) at the wrong cyanide-impregnated Tylenol (acetaminophen/ temperature, the accidental or deliberate introduction paracetamol) capsules. On 12 February 1986, the of water to one of the gas storage tanks, confusion in United States suspended sales of Tylenol capsules, detecting a rise in pressure in the tank and ineffectiveresponse to its detection - all these factors arebelieved to be responsible for the gas leak tragedy atUnion Carbide’s chemical plant in Bhopal, India.
Union Carbide has always refused to accept fullresponsibility for the disaster - though it accepted“moral responsibility” from the outset - maintainingthat sabotage by a disgruntled employee was themain cause of the disaster. The actual death tollfrom the Bhopal tragedy is undetermined. The mostaccurate estimate appears to be that over 3,000people died and over 300,000 were injured. About2,000 animals are estimated to have died and 7,000were injured severely. Vegetation was destroyed insurrounding areas. Many people exposed to the gaswill face a lifetime of ill-health with eye and lungdisorders. Known costs, including liability chargesand payments to build hospitals, exceed US$527m.
By 12 March 1991 Union Carbide had collectedUS$167m in insurance from the disaster.
and on 3 March 1986 the sale of the drug was haltedin a further 14 countries. On 17 November 1988 aUnited States district judge ruled that neitherJohnson & Johnson nor the grocery which sold thecyanide-laced capsules was liable, and acquitted thecompanies of negligence. The cost of the recall isestimated at US$150m.
It is alleged that the fire and explosion at thechemical warehouse of Sandoz at Schweizerhalle inBasle, Switzerland was probably caused by the use ofa flame to shrink-wrap plastic covers around palletsof paint. These may have smouldered for severalhours before bursting into flame. Sandoz believesthe fire may have been the result of an arson attack.
Fourteen people were injured and a cloud ofpoisonous gas was released into the atmosphere.
Water used to fight the fire washed 30 tonnes oftoxic chemicals into the River Rhine, turning it red The Herald of Free Enterprise roll-on roll-off car ferrysailed from Zeebrugge harbour with its inner andouter bow doors open. It capsized and sank as adirect result of water rushing through its open bowdoors. 192 people drowned: 154 passengers and 38crew out of a total 454 passengers and 80 crew.
Known legal costs total US$70m, but some activelawsuits remain.
The Norco refinery and chemical plant exploded afterhydrocarbon gas escaped from a corroded pipe in a and killing thousands of fish. Loss of the warehouseand the 800 tonnes of chemicals which were storedinside is estimated at US$12m, with an additionalUS$6m required for clean-up of the warehouse. Forthese damages Sandoz is covered by insurance. It isestimated that Sandoz will pay US$67m in liabilityclaims. The company is believed to have liabilityinsurance totalling between US$67m and US$325m.
Herald of Free Enterprise SinkingP&O, 6 March 1987 catalytic cracker and was ignited. Louisiana statepolice evacuated 2,800 residents from nearbyneighbourhoods. Seven workers were killed and 42injured. The total cost arising from the Norco blastis estimated at US$706m, comprising US$490m toreplace the cracker and US$216m in liability claims.
Shell is believed to be fully insured for the event.
the bombing was ordered by Iran and the bomb was planted by Libya with the connivance of Syria.
Relatives of those killed in the crash have filed suit At 9.45 pm on the day of the explosion one of two against Pan Am. A few lawsuits have been settled condensate injection pumps failed on the Piper Alpha but many remain active. Following the verdictagainst Pan Am of “wilful misconduct”, UnitedStates Aviation Insurance Group (USAIG) revised itsoriginal estimate of liability claims from US$250m toUS$470m in total (21 February 1994). The hull ofthe aircraft was insured for US$32m. On 21December 1989, Pan Am estimated that it hadsuffered a revenue shortfall of US$150m in lostbookings as a result of the disaster, bringing theestimated total cost to US$652m.
oil platform in the North Sea, 120 miles east of Wick,north east Scotland. The other pump had been shutdown for maintenance and, unaware of its condition,workers are assumed to have restarted it. Thisresulted in a leak of condensate, creating a smallexplosion which knocked out safety equipment, and aseries of major blasts caused a fireball. At 10.20 pm,the gas pipeline riser fractured, leading to a massiveexplosion and the collapse of the drilling derrick. 167workers died. The bodies of 31 were never recovered. Only 63 people survived. The principal cause of death was smoke inhalation and a few died The fully loaded United States supertanker Exxon of burns. The total financial cost of the disaster is Valdez, ran aground in the Gulf of Alaska. It was manoeuvering through heavy ice when it ran intoBligh Reef, puncturing 8 of its 13 cargo tanks andspilling 11m gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. 1,500 miles of pristine shoreline were polluted, more wildlife was killed than in any otherindustrial accident and Alaskan natives, particularly A terrorist bomb exploded aboard Pan Am Boeing fishermen, suffered long term harm to their 747 Flight 103 causing the aircraft to crash. The livelihoods and subsistence way of life. The latest bomb exploded over the Scottish market town of estimate for the total cost of the oil spill is over Lockerbie, about 55 minutes after taking off from US$11.5bn (7 October 1994). This figure comprises Heathrow. 270 people were killed; all 243 passengers US$8.7bn in damages, US$2.5bn already paid and 16 crew on board, and 11 people on the ground.
towards the clean-up operation and US$316.5m paid On 21 December 1993, investigations revealed that to victims of the accident. It appears that the International Tanker Owners Indemnity Association Adverse side-effects, including confusion, agitation, provided US$400m of pollution insurance cover for hallucinations, paranoia, amnesia and aggressive the “Exxon Valdez” and reinsured about US$388m in behaviour are alleged to result from taking the Lloyd’s and member companies of the Institute of prescription drug, Halcion - Upjohn’s brand-name for benzodiazepine hypnotic triazolam. On 3 October1991, the FDA approved the drug, reporting that the“benefits outweighed its risks”. Although Upjohnhas settled some cases, the company still faceshundreds of lawsuits over the drug. Marketing ofHalcion remains suspended in Britain, Norway,Argentina and Brazil. Known legal costs includethose for the “Grundberg case”, a US$21m claimwhere Upjohn settled out of court for an undisclosedamount, and US$2m for a another case.
Pasadena ExplosionPhillips Petroleum, 23 October 1989 Halcion Side-EffectsUpjohn, 19 September 1989 The explosion occurred after a seal on a polyethylenereactor ruptured, leaking highly inflammable ethyleneand isobutane gas from a pipeline. It is unclear whatignited the gas. The fire blazed for more than eighthours before being brought under control and, withthe explosion, caused extensive damage to half thepetrochemical facility. 23 people were killed and 130injured. Total costs arising from the disaster areestimated at US$1,300m.
Violent secondary effects are alleged to result fromtaking the prescription anti-depressant drug, Prozac -Lilly’s brand-name for fluoxetine hydrochloride. On20 September 1991, the United States federal Foodand Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committeeissued a favourable verdict on Prozac, finding no linkbetween the drug and suicide. Numerous lawsuitshave been filed against Lilly, alleging that Prozac hasdriven people to murder another, suicide and otherforms of violence. None has been successful to date,although several are still pending.
The natural gas present in the Perrier spring atVergeze in the Gard, southern France contains anumber of impurities. The carbon filters whichshould have removed these impurities, includingcancer-inducing benzene, had become clogged. Afaulty warning light on the control panel wentundetected by employees for more than six months,allowing the filters to become blocked. When themineral water was found to be contaminated bybenzene, 160m bottles were recalled from 120countries. The bottles were destroyed and replaced.
Nobody suffered as a result of drinking the benzene-infected water. The Perrier group estimated that“l’incident Benzene” had cost it US$262.9m:US$197.5m for recalling and destroying the bottles,US$47.7m for related advertising communication,consultants and financial charges, and US$17.7m forassociated administration charges. Perrier did nothave product guarantee and recall insurance.
Defective glass, manufactured by BSN’s VereenigdeGlas, was used to make export beer bottles. Whenopened or transported, glass splinters could fall intothe beer. Heineken recalled, destroyed and replaced15.4 million bottles. Nobody was injured as a resultof the glass splinters. At the time of occurrence,Heineken estimated the loss to be anything between$10m and $50m. It was unclear whether Heineken’sproduct liability insurance policy would cover thelosses. Coverage is unlikely, given the small marketfor product recall in Europe. On 14 April 1994Vereenigde Glas agreed to compensate Heineken foran undisclosed sum.
A bomb, planted by the IRA, exploded in London’sfinancial district. The 45kg bomb was placed in a caroutside the Baltic Exchange which, together with theCommercial Union (CU) tower which accommodatesthe company’s headquarters, bore the brunt of theexplosion. Hundreds of CU’s computers werewrecked, 2,000 panes of glass were smashed and thetower was rendered useless for a year. Three peoplewere killed and 91 injured. On 19 April 1992 totalcosts were estimated at US$2,170m, comprisingUS$560m rebuilding costs, US$560m businessinterruption claims, and US$1,050m in repairs tocomputer links, roads and a church.
In order to isolate the effect of the catastrophe on time series regression of the return on stock i (R ) on shareholder value, it is necessary to rule out the the return on the market portfolio (R ). In this way, effect of other events that may impact on shareholder the results are controlled for market-wide influences.
value simultaneously. In this study, this isaccomplished in two phases. The first phase is at the The abnormal returns for each firm are accumulated individual company level and involves the filtering out of share price movements and the effects of market-wide factors. The result of this process is the estimation of so-called abnormal returns for a period immediately after the catastrophe. In the secondphase, the abnormal returns are aligned on the catastrophe (day 0) and averaged across the total CAR = cumulative abnormal return on portfolio p on sample. These average abnormal returns are then day t, relative to the day of the catastrophe (t = 0).
accumulated over what is now catastrophe time,resulting in a set of portfolio returns from day 0 N = the number of corporate catastrophes in portfolio known as cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The second phase filters out any company-specific effects In addition to examining the direct impact of the catastrophe on shareholder value, figures 2 and 3 Figures 1 and 4 show the CARs for portfolios of the report the impact on trading volume and volatility total sample and the portfolios of recoverers and respectively. The metric to evaluate the impact on non-recoverers. The CAR charts reflect the impact trading volume is defined relative to the average on shareholder value in percentage terms.
More formally , the abnormal return on share i on TV = trading volume of share i on day t.
ATV = 12 month average trading volume of share i, over event months -6 to 0 and 1 to 7.
UTV was calculated for each share for the first month following the event. It is assumed that whereas a corporate catastrophe may affect stockprice behaviour throughout the entire post-event year, any impact on trading activity will be evidentprimarily in the first post-event month only.
The expected return is modelled via a model of theform: Volatility is measured as the volatility in the daily share returns over a two year interval surrounding the catastrophe. These were then averaged across R = the return on the market portfolio on day t.
Pre-event and post-event variances were calculatedfor each catastrophe as follows: The model parameters, a and b , represent the intercept and slope coefficient respectively, estimated from a market model regression of the following form: The risk-adjustment procedure is based on the well- n = the number of trading days in the event window.
known Capital Asset Pricing Model. The systematicrisk parameter, beta, is calculated for each individual The raw data on share prices, trading volume and company, and is equal to the slope coefficient in a market capitalisation underlying this study were market index chosen varies according to the market obtained from the Datastream financial database.
in which the shares are traded. Since the abnormal The data are daily and relate to trading days. The returns on all shares are measured in real terms, their analysis is conducted relative to a common event additivity across numeraires appeals to Purchasing time, rather than in calendar time. In the case of Power Parity. Table 2 indicates the market index each catastrophe, abnormal returns are calculated in the local currency of the parent company, and the Data on trading volume were unavailable for Sandoz All other data were obtained from the annual reports and Perrier. Consequently, the catastrophe portfolio and accounts of the portfolio companies, and from comprises 13 catastrophes where trading volume is Reuters Textline, the international newspaper and analysed. On days where there was no trading, the data points were removed from the analysis and theaverage figures were adjusted accordingly.
1 The financial and operating results of Shell Oil Inc are prices and trading volume were chosen to represent Shell integrated into the consolidated accounts of Royal Dutch Oil in the analysis. Consolidated Group figures were used in Petroleum Company and The Shell Transport and Trading calculations of market capitalisation.
Company plc (henceforth “Shell”), where the former owns 60% of the Group concern and Shell owns the remaining 2 Daily index figures for the Paris Bourse were unavailable.
40%. As expected, the share price behaviour of Royal Consequently, weekly figures were used and it was assumed Dutch and Shell were found to be highly correlated; R2 = that the market index did not fluctuate during the week.
0.995. Consequently, for ease of data access, Shell share Dr Knight has extensive experience of working in the Deborah Pretty took her first degree in Industrial financial sector. He has also held chairs in the Economics and is now working in the field of risk University of Cape Town and in the International finance. Her previous experience includes risk Management Institute, Geneva (now IMD).
management consultancy on risk retention strategies Immediately before coming to Oxford he was the and alternative risk finance; writing and editing risk- Deputy Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies, related articles for professional and trade journals; a foundation within the Swiss National Bank (the and involvement in corporate strategic planning, central bank of Switzerland) - an institute with which marketing; and risk management education and he retains an active association. He is a visiting training. Immediately before beginning her doctorate, professor at a number of universities around the she was Project Manager with Sedgwick Energy & world including Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Marine Limited (risk advisers and insurance brokers) Chaussées (Paris), INSEAD (Paris), EOI (Madrid), who are sponsoring her research. Previously, she was a risk finance analyst with Tillinghast (actuarial University of Cape Town. Dr Knight is also programme director of the Oxford AdvancedManagement Programme.
Her special interests include: Corporate RiskManagement Strategy; Economics of Insurance; His special interests include: Corporate and Financial Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) Techniques; Strategy; International Investments and Corporate Strategic Planning; Risk Perception and Analysis; Finance; Currency Risk Management; Joint Ventures; Crisis Management; Financial Modelling.
Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Ownership andGovernance; International Capital and ExchangeMarkets.


LES INFILTRATIONS DEFINITION Sens strict = injections intra articulaires d’un corticoïde. Définition élargie : « infiltrations » = toutes lesinjections locales d’un dérivé corticoïde. Exclut les injections systémiques de corticoïdes : LES QUESTIONS ÿ Diagnostic au moins lésionnel. ÿ traitement validé par la communautéÿ hiérarchie thérapeutique. ÿ contre-ind

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